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VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA; ROBERT GREGORY, 
CASE MANAGER, VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA; 
CHRIS ARRAYO, CASE AIDE, VOLUNTEERS OF 
AMERICA; EDWARD McNAIR, CASE AIDE, 
VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA, 
 
       William Asquith, 
         Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-00300) 
District Judge: Joseph E. Irenas 
 
Argued June 2, 1999 
 
Before: SCIRICA, McKEE, Circuit Judges, and 
SCHWARZER,* District Judge 
 
(Filed July 30, 1999) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 
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        (ARGUED) 
       Office of the Attorney General of 
        New Jersey 
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       Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
       Trenton, NJ 08625 
 
       Attorney for William H. Fauver, 
       Commissioner, Department of 
       Corrections; Dorothy Keller, 
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       Coordinator, Appellees 
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       Law Offices of Thomas Dempster, III 
       161 Gaither Drive 
       Centerpointe at East Gate 
       Suite 201 
       Mount Laurel, NJ 08054 
 
       Attorneys for Volunteers of America; 
       Ken Safco, Director, Volunteers of 
       America, Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARZER, District Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we must decide whether William Asquith, 
a former New Jersey State inmate, had a protected liberty 
interest in remaining in New Jersey's Residential 
Community Release Agreement Program. We find he did not 
and, accordingly, affirm the district court. 
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FACTS 
 
William Asquith was serving a five-year sentence under 
the custody of the New Jersey Department of Corrections 
("DOC") when he entered New Jersey's Residential 
Community Release Agreement Program. Under that 
program, Asquith lived in a halfway house run by 
Volunteers of America ("VOA") and worked nearby as a 
maintenance mechanic. After several months without any 
significant incident, a VOA case aide reported that Asquith 
returned to the halfway house smelling of alcohol and that 
he failed a Breathalyzer test. Under New Jersey's 
regulations, "imbibing in alcoholic beverages" is a "major 
violation" and results in the "immediate transfer of the 
inmate to a correctional facility within the New Jersey 
Department of Corrections." N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.21. As a 
result, Asquith was immediately removed from the halfway 
house and returned to prison. At a subsequent hearing to 
determine whether Asquith had committed the major 
violation, he was found not guilty. Asquith was not, 
however, returned to the halfway house, and the DOC 
provided no hearing to determine whether he should be 
returned. 
 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Asquith filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1994) 
alleging he was denied due process of law when the DOC 
failed to return him to the halfway house withoutfirst 
providing a hearing. The district court dismissed his 
complaint as frivolous. On appeal, this court vacated the 
order of dismissal and remanded the case for "development 
of a record as to the existence of a liberty interest under the 
due process clause itself," noting that the district court did 
not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). On remand, the 
district court granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment holding that Asquith had no liberty interest 
under the Due Process Clause itself or under New Jersey 
State law. See Asquith v. Volunteers of America, 1 F. Supp. 
2d 405, 413, 417-18 (D.N.J. 1998). Asquith now appeals. 
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The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1343 (1994). We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1994). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A protected liberty interest may arise from only one of 
two sources: the Due Process Clause or the laws of a state. 
See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). The district 
court determined that Asquith had no protected liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause because, while in 
the halfway house, Asquith lived a life "of incarceration, 
strict limitation and certain sharply conscribed privileges," 
and under the Due Process Clause "prisoners under 
confinement do not have inherent liberty interests in 
particular modes, places or features of confinement or 
custody." Asquith, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 410, 412. The district 
court also held that under Sandin v. Conner, the state had 
not deprived Asquith of a liberty interest because returning 
Asquith to prison was not an "atypical" or"significant" 
hardship warranting due process protection. See Asquith, 1 
F. Supp. 2d at 417-18. We review the district court's grant 
of summary judgment de novo, see Pennsylvania Coal Ass'n 
v. Babbit, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995), and affirm. 
 
I. LIBERTY INTEREST UNDER THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE 
 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that "[a]s long 
as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the 
prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon 
him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the 
Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's 
treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight." 
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). Thus, a 
prisoner does not have a liberty interest in remaining in a 
preferred facility within a state's prison system. 
See Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 
215, 224-25 (1976). In Meachum the Court explained that 
"given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been 
constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the 
State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its 
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prison system . . . . The Constitution does not . . . 
guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any 
particular prison." Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224. 
 
On the other hand, the Court has found protected liberty 
interests after an inmate is released from institutional 
confinement. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), 
the Court recognized a parolee's liberty interest in 
remaining conditionally free on parole: "[H]e can be 
gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends 
and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. 
. . . [H]is condition is very different from that of 
confinement in a prison." Id. at 482. Relying on Morrissey, 
the Court in Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997), held 
that an inmate enrolled in Oklahoma's pre-parole program 
also had a protected liberty interest entitling him to due 
process before he could be removed from the program. 
There the pre-parolee "was released from prison before the 
expiration of his sentence. He kept his own residence; he 
sought, obtained, and maintained a job; and he lived a life 
generally free of the incidents of imprisonment." Id. at 148. 
While the Supreme Court recognized that the pre-parolee's 
freedoms were limited--"[h]e was not permitted to use 
alcohol, to incur other than educational debt, or to travel 
outside the county without permission"--the limitations 
were equivalent to those of the parolee in Morrissey, and 
thus, did not "render such liberty beyond procedural 
protection." Id. 
 
Asquith argues that New Jersey's community release 
program affords a degree of liberty substantially similar to 
the liberty protected in Young and that the district court 
improperly "focused its attention on the restrictions 
imposed on community release participants and ignored the 
degree of liberty to which plaintiff was entitled while he was 
in community release status." We recognize that Asquith's 
liberty was significantly greater while he lived in the 
halfway house than it was while in prison. In addition to 
leaving the halfway house for work, Asquith could obtain 
passes to visit family, shop, eat at restaurants, or go to the 
local YMCA. Such liberties are similar to those of the pre- 
parolee in Young. 
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Unlike the pre-parolee in Young, however, Asquith never 
left institutional confinement. In Young the pre-parolee 
lived in his own home. See id. Asquith lived in a strictly 
monitored halfway house. While at the facility, he was 
subject to a curfew and had to "stand count" several times 
a day. He was also required to submit to urine monitoring 
and his room could be searched. Asquith could leave the 
house, but had to sign in and out, and his weekend passes 
were limited to two nights every seven days. VOA would 
monitor the time it took Asquith to travel to and from the 
halfway house, and he was required to take public 
transportation. While away, he was also required to check 
in by phone several times each day. If he could not be 
contacted within two hours, he would be deemed an 
escapee. 
 
These restrictions are dispositive because they amount to 
institutional confinement. Cf. Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 
F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a prisoner in a 
halfway house "remains under confinement in a 
correctional institution"). The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that while a prisoner remains in 
institutional confinement, the Due Process Clause does not 
protect his interest in remaining in a particular facility. See 
Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242 ("[T]he Due Process Clause by 
its own force [does not] require[ ] hearings whenever prison 
authorities transfer a prisoner to another institution . . . 
[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to 
which the prisoner is subjected are within the sentence 
imposed upon him . . . ."); Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25 
("Neither, in our view, does the Due Process Clause in and 
of itself protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer 
from one institution to another . . . ."). Thus, Asquith's 
removal from the halfway house did not trigger the 
protections of the Due Process Clause. 
 
While the fact that Asquith remained in institutional 
confinement is dispositive, we note that New Jersey's 
community release program is unlike parole in another 
way. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that one 
incident of the parolee's liberty is the "the implicit promise 
that parole will be revoked only if the he fails to live up to 
the parole conditions." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 & n.8; 
 
                                6 
  
see also Young, 520 U.S. at 150-51 (emphasizing the lack 
of evidence on the record showing that the pre-parolee's 
continued participation was contingent upon extrinsic 
events). Here, there was no implicit promise that Asquith's 
limited freedoms might not be arbitrarily revoked. The 
program agreement which Asquith signed provided that 
return to a correctional facility would terminate his 
participation, and New Jersey's regulations required that if 
a program member was merely charged with a major 
violation, he would be returned to a correctional facility. 
See N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.21. Moreover, the Commissioner is 
authorized "at any time [to] transfer an inmate from one 
place of confinement to another." See N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.2. 
Thus, Asquith's continued participation was dependent 
upon extrinsic events, and he could have no expectation 
that he would remain in the program once charged with a 
major violation. 
 
II. STATE-CREATED LIBERTY INTEREST 
 
The Due Process Clause also protects liberty interests 
created by the laws or regulations of a state. See Sandin, 
515 U.S. at 483. Asquith argues that under Sandin, the 
"polestar for identifying state-created liberty interests is the 
`nature of the deprivation' " and that the district court erred 
by failing to recognize that his life while in the community 
release program was "fundamentally different from 
incarceration behind the walls" of prison. 
 
In Sandin, the Supreme Court established a new 
framework for determining whether a prisoner has been 
deprived of a state- created liberty interest. It held that a 
prisoner is deprived of a state-created liberty interest only 
if the deprivation "imposes atypical and significant 
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents 
of prison life." Id. at 484. 
 
Even if Asquith's life in prison was "fundamentally 
different" from life at the halfway house, Sandin does not 
permit us to compare the prisoner's own life before and 
after the alleged deprivation. Rather, we must compare the 
prisoner's liberties after the alleged deprivation with the 
normal incidents of prison life. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 
485-86. "[T]he baseline for determining what is `atypical 
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and significant'--the `ordinary incidents of prison life'--is 
ascertained by what a sentenced inmate may reasonably 
expect to encounter as a result of his or her conviction in 
accordance with due process of law." Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 
F.3d 703, 706 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Callender v. 
Sioux City Residential Treatment Facility, 88 F.3d 666, 669 
(8th Cir. 1996) (removing an inmate from a work release 
program and returning him to prison did not deprive the 
inmate of a liberty interest under Sandin because prison 
was "not atypical of what inmates have to endure in daily 
prison life"); Dominique v. Weld, 73 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (1st 
Cir. 1996) (same). Since an inmate is normally incarcerated 
in prison, Asquith's return to prison did not impose atypical 
and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life and, therefore, did not deprive him 
of a protected liberty interest. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because Asquith did not have a protected liberty interest 
in remaining in the halfway house, either under the Due 
Process Clause or under state law, the district court 
properly granted summary judgment and dismissed 
Asquith's claim for deprivation of due process. 
 
AFFIRM. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                8 
 
